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Benchmarking global supply chains: the
power of the ‘ethical audit’ regime
GENEVIEVE LEBARON AND JANE LISTER*
Abstract. This article critically investigates the growing power and effectiveness of the
‘ethical’ compliance audit regime. Over the last decade, audits have evolved from a tool for
companies to track internal organisational performance into a transnational governing
mechanism to measure and strengthen corporate accountability globally and shape corporate
responsibility norms. Drawing on original interviews, we assess the effectiveness of supply
chain benchmarks and audits in promoting environmental and social improvements in global
retail supply chains. Two principal arguments emerge from our analysis. First, that audits
can be best understood as a productive form of power, which codiﬁes and legitimates retail
corporations’ poor social and environmental records, and shapes state approaches to supply
chain governance. Second, that growing public and government trust in audit metrics ends
up concealing real problems in global supply chains. Retailers are, in fact, auditing only
small portions of supply chains, omitting the portions of supply chains where labour and
environmental abuse are most likely to take place. Furthermore, the audit regime tends to
address labour and environmental issues very unevenly, since ‘people’ are more difﬁcult to
classify and verify through numbers than capital and product quality.
Genevieve LeBaron is Vice-Chancellor’s Fellow in Politics at the University of Shefﬁeld. Her
research investigates the global growth and governance of forced labour in retail supply chains
and the politics of corporate social responsibility. She has published recent journal articles in
Brown Journal of World Affairs, Review of International Political Economy, New Political
Economy, International Feminist Journal of Politics, among other journals. She is co-author,
with Peter Dauvergne, of Protest Inc.: The Corporatization of Activism (Polity, 2014).
Jane Lister is Senior Research Fellow at the University of British Columbia. Her research
examines the environmental policy implications of corporate social responsibility and trans-
national private governance. She is the author of three books: Eco-Business: A Big Brand
Takeover of Sustainability (MIT Press, 2013 with Peter Dauvergne); Corporate Social
Responsibility and the State (UBC Press, 2011); and Timber (Polity, 2011 with Peter
Dauvergne). Her recent journal articles appear in Global Policy, Global Environmental
Change, Millennium, Progress in Development Studies, and Organization & Environment.
Introduction
In June 2014, The Guardian ran a headline news story revealing the wide-
spread use of ‘slavery’ and ‘human trafﬁcking’ by employers in the Thai shrimp
* We are grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for research funding
and to Peter Dauvergne for many inspiring conversations. Thanks as well to Helen Turton, Benjamin
Richardson, Joel Quirk, André Broome, and the participants in the Benchmarking in Global Governance
workshop held at University of Warwick in March 2014 for comments on an earlier draft of this article.
All remaining shortcomings are our own.
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industry.1 Guardian journalists traced the slavery-produced shrimp into the freezers of
some of the world’s biggest retailers, including Walmart, Tesco, Costco, Aldi, and
Morrison’s. While the presence of severe labour exploitation in the shrimp industry
isn’t surprising given retailers’ low-cost, high volume business model, what was
surprising – and not reported – is that the shrimp had been ‘ethically’ certiﬁed. Indeed,
in the wake of The Guardian’s reports, one of Aldi’s key suppliers defensively noted
that the shrimp had been certiﬁed2 by GlobalGAP, ‘a non-governmental organization
that sets voluntary standards for the certiﬁcation of agricultural products around the
globe’.3 Just as with the 2013 collapse of Bangladesh’s Rana Plaza garment factory
mere months after it successfully passed a compliance audit,4 the discovery of severe
labour exploitation within a ‘certiﬁed’ supply chain raises crucial questions about the
effectiveness and power of global supply chain benchmarks.
Over the last decade, the governance of global supply chains has become
increasingly reliant on a ‘benchmarking regime’5 comprised of company codes of
supplier conduct, voluntary certiﬁcations and standards (for example, Rainforest
Alliance Certiﬁcation), standardised metrics (for example, Higg Index for ‘ethical’
apparel), and aggregated indexes for comparing corporate environmental and social
performance (for example, the Global Reporting Initiative). Through programmes
like the Ethical Trade Initiative and Sustainable Apparel Coalition, companies and
civil society groups are developing transnational accountability tools like corporate
social responsibility (CSR) certiﬁcations, which they claim will strengthen
environmental and social performance within complex global supply chains. Audit
inspections are a cornerstone of these programmes, purportedly allowing
multinational retail companies like Walmart and Nike to detect and address
problems like environmental degradation or forced labour abuses among their
thousands of suppliers. The role and power of audits has grown signiﬁcantly over the
last decade, as audits have evolved from a tool that companies used to track internal
organisational performance into a central mechanism of non-state efforts to measure
and strengthen corporate accountability globally. Increasingly seen as a way to
monitor and improve labour and environmental standards within production, reliance
on the audit regime is deepening in the face of inadequate and declining state
involvement in global corporate governance.
As we document in this article, over the last decade, global supply chain
benchmarks have become increasingly prevalent and inﬂuential in shaping corporate
responsibility norms, and particularly norms around labour and environmental
practices within global production. Retailers claim that their audit-based CSR
programmes have advanced both environmental (for example, reduced carbon and
waste) and labour (for example, reduced overtime, higher wages) conditions. Yet, as a
growing evidence base reveals, audits are ineffective tools for detecting, reporting, or
1 Kate Hodal, Chris Kelly, Felicity Lawrence, Caz Stuart, Thibaut Remy, Irene Baque, Mary Carson, and
Maggie O’Kane, ‘Globalised Slavery: How Big Supermarkets are Selling Prawns in Supply Chain Fed by
Slave Labour’, The Guardian, available at: {http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/video/
2014/jun/10/slavery-supermarket-supply-trail-prawns-video} accessed 10 July 2014.
2 Intraﬁsh, ‘Shrimp were GlobalGAP Certiﬁed, Aldi Supplier Says in Wake of Slavery Reports’, available
at: {www.intraﬁsh.com/news/article1392263.ece} accessed 10 July 2014.
3 GlobalGAP, ‘About Us’, available at: {http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/} accessed 10 July 2014.
4 Stephanie Clifford and Steven Greenhouse, ‘Fast and Flawed Inspections of Factories Abroad’, New
York Times, available at: {http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/business/global/superﬁcial-visits-and-
trickery-undermine-foreign-factory-inspections.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0} accessed 10 July 2014.
5 André Broome and Joel Quirk, ‘Governing the world at a distance: the practice of global benchmarking’,
Review of International Studies, 41:5 (2015), pp. 819–41.
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correcting environmental and labour problems in supply chains. In fact, they may
even be serving to worsen supplier practices as they shape a global business culture of
‘check-box compliance’ to a narrowing set of quantitative ‘key performance
measures’.6 Furthermore, eco and ‘ethical’ certiﬁcation may be increasing consumer
demand for products that can create further negative social repercussions to workers
and communities that fall outside the audit scope.
Although the interdisciplinary literatures on private governance and CSR have
analysed shortcomings in audit design and implementation, the global governance
implications of growing state, business, and NGO reliance on audits have been widely
overlooked. Scholars within management studies and global political economy
scholarship, for instance, have investigated and debated whether and under what
conditions audits improve environmental and labour practices within supply chains.7
These debates have evolved along highly technical lines of inquiry whereby audits and
associated codes of conduct have tended to be approached as apolitical and neutral
instruments. In common with large swathes of liberal scholarship on governance, the
underlying assumption has been that due to inadequate state regulatory capacity in
many countries in the ‘developing world’, private governance tools such as audits have
emerged as efﬁcient and effective strategies to promote change. Yet, this approach
overlooks the role that governments and ﬁrms have played in strategically engineering
the ‘governance gaps’ that audits and other forms of CSR have emerged to ‘solve’, as
well as the political nature of private transnational governance more broadly.
This article investigates the deepening role and power of the audit regime, as part
of the broader shift towards benchmarking as a form of supply chain governance (see
also Tony Porter’s article in this Special Issue).8 Conceptually, it highlights the need to
investigate audits and other CSR instruments not as technical or neutral tools, but
rather as highly politicised, productive forms of power. Power that is intertwined with
the expansion of corporate control and proﬁtability, as well as with ‘leadership and
expertise intended to sustain and enlarge capitalist market society and its associated
6 See Stephen Davy and Carol Richards, ‘Supermarkets and private standards: Unintended consequences
of the audit ritual’, Agriculture and Human Values, 30:2 (2013), pp. 271–81; Hau Lee, Erica Plambeck,
and Pamela Yatso, ‘Incentivizing sustainability in your Chinese supply chain’, The European Business
Review, May/June (2012); Power, ‘Evaluating the audit explosion’, Law & Policy, 25:3 (2003), pp. 185–
202; Richard Locke, The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in the Global
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Ross Taplin, Yafang Zhao, and Alistair
Brown, ‘Failure of auditors: the lack of compliance for business combinations in China’, Regulation &
Governance, EarlyView DOI:10.111/rego.12011. See also Ole Jacob Sending and Jon Harald Sande Lie,
‘The limits of global authority: How the World Bank benchmarks economies in Ethiopia and Malawi’,
Review of International Studies, 41:4 (2015), pp. 993–1010.
7 Gary Gerefﬁ, ‘Can Global Brands Create Just Supply Chains?’, Boston Review, available at: {http://www.
bostonreview.net/forum/can-global-brands-create-just-supply-chains/host-countries-can-act} accessed 10
July 2013; Richard Locke, The Promise and Limits of Private Power; Michael Power, The Audit Society:
Rituals of Veriﬁcation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Power, ‘Evaluating the audit explosion’,
pp. 185–202; Michael Toffel, Jodi L. Short, and Melissa Ouellet, Reinforcing Regulatory Regimes: How
States, Civil Society, and Codes of Conduct Promote Adherence to Global Labor Standards, Harvard
Business School Technology and Operations Management Unit Working Paper 13-045, available at:
{http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_65_toffel_short_ouellet.pdf}
accessed 3 April 2014.
8 As distinct from Tony Porter who examines the incremental capabilities of benchmarking as a potentially
effective ‘accelerator’ or information ‘relay’ management mechanism in improving business practice
within collaborative governance networks, we focus on the broader more fundamental procedural and
normative global regulatory limits of benchmarking (as the tenet of the audit regime) in blocking more
transformative social and environmental change. See Tony Porter, ‘Global benchmarking networks:
the cases of disaster risk reduction and supply chains’, Review of International Studies, 41:5 (2015),
pp. 865–86.
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principles of governance’.9 We argue that far from helping ﬁrms, governments, and
consumers to ‘monitor’ and address social and environmental problems, the audit regime
is serving to stabilise, legitimise, and conceal endemic problems within supply chains.
More speciﬁcally, we argue that many audit systems are designed to be ineffective at
detecting and communicating the environmental and labour abuses fundamentally
associated with the global retail business model, and that powerful business interests
leverage for their own gains highly strategic control over how and when audits are
conducted, and what is evaluated. In developing this argument, we synthesise across
recent large-scale studies of audit ineffectiveness, as well as draw on original interviews
with ethical auditors, retail buyers, consumer goods suppliers, NGO representatives, and
CSR managers and experts from the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and
China, as well as factory visits in and around the Pearl River Delta region of China.10
The article unfolds in four parts. In the ﬁrst section, we document the rise of the
audit regime and argue that it can be best understood as a structural and productive
form of power11 that codiﬁes and legitimates retail corporations’ poor social and
environmental records and shapes state approaches to supply chain governance. In the
second section, we argue that growing public and government trust in the metrics
generated by audits ends up concealing real problems in global supply chains. Retailers
are, in fact, auditing only small portions of supply chains, and tend to omit the portions
of supply chains where labour and environmental abuse are most likely to take place. In
section three, we assess variation in audit effectiveness regarding environmental and
labour practices. We argue that the audit regime tends to address labour and
environmental issues unevenly, since ‘people’ are more difﬁcult to classify and verify
through numbers than capital and product quality. We conclude by considering how, as
NGO involvement is expanding political traction of social and environmental
benchmarks veriﬁed through audits, the audit regime ultimately disguises a
normative, market-based policy agenda in seemingly objective tools and metrics.
Audits as a productive form of power
Corporate use of compliance audits as internal tools to examine and measure
organisational non-ﬁnancial performance stretches back to the 1980s and 1990s, as
9 Stephen Gill (ed.), Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), p. 1.
10 Secondary data collection for this article involved a desk-based review of the audit industry, with a focus on
audit programmes, protocols and retail companies’ codes of conduct for suppliers. Primary data collection
involved semi-structured elite interviews. A total of 23 in-person interviews and 2 telephone interviews were
conducted in China, North America, and the United Kingdom with retail buyers, auditors, consumer goods
suppliers, factory managers, NGO representatives, trade unionists, and CSR managers and experts. A site
visit to Guangdong province, China, took place in April 2012 and interviews and factory visits were
conducted at and around the China Import and Export Fair (‘The Canton Fair’). The UK interviews were
conducted in March 2013, in and around London. The North American interviews were conducted in
Vancouver (Canada) and Seattle (US) between May 2012 and July 2013. The interview and factory visit
data presented here is intended to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive.
11 We are indebted to Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall’s conception of productive power as ‘the
constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive
practices of broad and general social scope’. See Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in
international politics’, International Organization, 59 (Winter 2005), pp. 55–7. We are indebted to neo-
Gramscian global political economy scholarship for our conception of the structural power of business
and audits. See, for example, Stephen Gill (ed.), Power and Resistance in the New World Order (New
York: Palgrave, 2003); Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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governments outsourced and encouraged industry self-regulation.12 But the adoption of
audits as a global corporate regulatory mechanism is much more recent. Alongside other
benchmarking tools, the rise of audits has taken place in the context of a ‘decentering’ of
regulation and enforcement of labour and environmental standards away from states.13
These processes have occurred as part of broader transformations in the global
economy, including the rise of neoliberal forms of globalisation.14 As has been widely
documented in the global governance literature, such transformations have entailed
dramatic changes in approaches to economic and corporate regulation as states have
redeﬁned their relationships with market actors and especially with transnational
corporations. As governments have conferred ‘privileged rights and citizenship and
representation on corporate capital’,15 and opened the door to the heightened
involvement of private actors in economic governance processes, corporations have
increasingly set and enforced their own standards and rules. Today, in the context of the
privatisation and marketisation of governance, an increasingly ‘signiﬁcant degree of
global order is provided by individual ﬁrms that agree to cooperate, either formally or
informally, in establishing an international framework for their economic activity’.16
As transnational corporations have become increasingly entrusted to govern
themselves, and report on their efforts to government and the public,17 there has been
a persistent decline of state-based monitoring of production processes in many
countries. For instance, as the International Labour Organisation has documented,
there has been a steep downturn in the number of labour inspections conducted in
countries in both the global North and South, and in some instances, the outright
elimination of the labour inspectorate.18 Similarly, scholars in global environmental
12 David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Trans-
forming the Public Sector (New York: Plume, 1993); Power, The Audit Society.
13 cf. Julia Black, ‘Decentering regulation: Understanding the role of regulation and self regulation in a
“post regulatory” world’, Current Legal Problems, 54 (2001), pp. 103–46; See, for example, Tim Büthe
and Walter Mattli, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Claire Cutler, ‘Private transnational governance and the
crisis of global leadership’, in Stephen Gill (ed.), Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 56–70.
14 For an overview of neoliberal globalisation’s discursive and material characteristics, see Jamie Peck,
Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
15 Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, market civilisation, and disciplinary neoliberalism’, Millennium Journal of
International Studies, 24:3 (1995), pp. 413. See also Claire Cutler, Virginia Hauﬂer, and Tony Porter,
Private Authority and International Affairs (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). See also
James Harrison and Sharifah Sekalala, ‘Benchmarking human rights at the United Nations: Self-
reporting by states and corporations’, Review of International Studies, 41:5 (2015), pp. 925–45.
16 Cutler, Hauﬂer, and Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs, pp. 3–4.
17 The recent wave of audit-based approaches to ‘modern slavery’ and forced labour – developed by multi-
stakeholder coalitions of NGOs and retail and brand corporations – are illustrative. In 2012, California
passed the ‘Transparency in Supply Chains’ (TISC) Act, which requires large companies to report on what
they are doing to verify their global supply chains against forced labour, trafﬁcking, and slavery. The TISC
Act institutionalises audit-based approaches to dealing with severe labour exploitation, requiring compa-
nies to report on their voluntary efforts to detect and address severe exploitation, rather than mandating
speciﬁc standards or benchmarks and requiring companies to demonstrate compliance. Similarly, in the
United Kingdom, the draft Modern Slavery Bill currently before Parliament deepens the ‘light-touch’
approach to business regulation in that country, and includes only a cursory treatment of supply chains. In
a recent press release entitled, ‘Government Asks Retailers to Lead the Way on Transparent Supply
Chains’, the government announces plans to work with retailers on a ‘best practices’ report, centered
around ‘ethical audit programmes, outlining some of the main certiﬁcation schemes and collaborative
initiatives’. See UKDepartment for Business, Innovation & Skills, ‘Government Asks Retailers to Lead the
Way on Transparent Supply Chains’, available at: {https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-
asks-retailers-to-lead-the-way-on-transparent-supply-chains} accessed 4 August 2014.
18 Renato Bignami, Giuseppe Casale, and Mario Fasani, Labour Inspection and Employment Relationship
(Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2013).
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politics have documented persistent declines in state-based environmental compliance
efforts.19 Within this context, as we analyse in the remainder of this section, audits
have emerged as a key tool of corporate supply chain governance. We argue that
although the corporate, NGO, and state motivations for institutionalising the audit
regime vary, the adoption of audits nevertheless reﬂects an alignment of these actors’
interests and ideologies in market-based global governance. We argue further that in
codifying and legitimating corporations’ poor environmental and labour records, the
audit regime is playing a productive role in shaping public and policymakers’
perceptions of corporate practices, as well as corporate power globally.
Adopting audits
The shift towards self-regulation of corporations has intersected with the growing
willingness of certain advocacy organisations to work alongside transnational
corporations towards environmental and social goals.20 The reasons for the
proliferation and deepening of partnerships between non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and ﬁrms are complex. For some organisations, frustration
with decades of slow progress and failure to achieve signiﬁcant ‘scale’ in the outcomes
of their social and environmental advocacy efforts has prompted them to shift their
strategies towards market-based approaches. For others, in states like Canada and the
US, growing amounts of government funding for NGO activities has come to depend
on corporate involvement, making corporate collaboration as a necessity for
continued operation. In short, although NGOs’ interests in partnering towards
initiatives – and supply chain benchmarking more broadly – vary across organisation
cause, size, region, at a general level it is clear that many organisations have either
chosen or been forced by governments to join forces with corporations, and have
come to engage in activities that legitimate rather than challenge highly unequal and
unsustainable patterns of global production. These shifting relationships between
states, civil society, and corporations have been driven by broad socioeconomic
changes that are, as Peter Dauvergne and Genevieve LeBaron describe, ‘reconﬁguring
power and resistance globally, as ﬁrms engage social forces through corporate social
responsibility, as governments cut social services and devolve authority to companies,
as consumerism spreads, and as states suppress public dissent’.21
In the context of these reconﬁgurations, large numbers of NGOs are now
attempting to modify corporate practices through ‘private governance’ initiatives that
depend heavily on audits.22 Projecting a positive image to the public of taking direct
action to come up with solutions with the biggest companies contributing to the
19 For an overview, see Peter Newell, Globalization and the Environment: Capitalism, Ecology, and Power
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2012).
20 Peter Dauvergne and Jane Lister, Eco-Business: A Big-Brand Take-over of Sustainability (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 2013); Peter Dauvergne and Genevieve LeBaron, Protest Inc.: the Corporatization
of Activism (Cambridge: Polity, 2014); Peter Newell, ‘Managing multinationals: the governance of
investment for the environment’, Journal of International Development, 13:7 (2001), pp. 907–19; Philipp
Pattberg, ‘The institutionalization of private governance: How business and nonproﬁt organizations
agree on transnational rules’, Governance, 18:4 (2005), pp. 589–610.
21 Dauvergne and LeBaron, Protest Inc., p. 2.
22 As Robert Falkner explains, ‘“private governance” emerges at the global level where the interactions
among private actors or between private actors on the one hand and civil society and state actors on the
other, give rise to institutional arrangements that structure and direct actors’ behavior in an issue-speciﬁc
area.’ See Robert Falkner, ‘Private environmental governance and International Relations: Exploring the
links’, Global Environmental Politics, 3:2 (2003), p. 72.
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biggest problems, in the past ﬁve years, NGOs have increasingly partnered with ﬁrms
to develop or implement voluntary CSR programmes: Greenpeace has worked with
Coca Cola to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; Conservation International has
worked with Walmart to track and mitigate illegal sourcing for its jewellery products;
Oxfam has partnered with Unilever to integrate smallholder farmers ‘fairly’ into
transnational supply chains. Explaining why they are working so closely with
Walmart, the head of Conservation International explains, ‘Given the millions of
items carried by its thousands of stores, possibilities virtually are endless for the
company to create extraordinary impact.’23
Many NGO-business programmes rely on benchmarking practices, including
audit inspections – rather than state labour inspectors or environmental agencies, or
codiﬁed legal agreements – to test and ensure compliance and effectiveness to
certiﬁcations (for example, Forest Stewardship Council), standards (for example,
Fairtrade), and retailers’ own sustainability commitments (for example, Sainsburys’
20 by 20 Sustainability Plan).24
Simply put, compliance auditing involves independently verifying supplier
performance to corporate codes of conduct, often through the use of ‘independent’
but for-proﬁt ﬁrms like SGS or UL, hired by the brand buyer. As NGOs have embraced
private governance as a means to ‘scale up’ and strengthen corporate accountability –
and thus, broadly improve labour conditions and preserve the environment – they have
also adopted audits as a global corporate regulatory mechanism.
The standards and certiﬁcation schemes proliferating among multi-stakeholder
coalitions are audit-based. For instance, the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative coalition – which brings executives from Chevron and Shell together
with NGOs like Global Witness, Oxfam, and Transparency International – has
developed the EITI standard validated by audit ﬁrm Deloitte, among others.25
Similarly, through the Fair Labor Association (FLA), organisations like the Global
Fairness Initiative, Maquila Solidarity Network, and Human Rights First26
have worked with big brand partners including Nestlé, Nike, Adidas, Apple, and
H&M to develop the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct.27 Adherence to the
FLA’s Code is enforced through independent social audit ﬁrms, including Verité
and Impactt.28
Some NGOs have also come to use supply chain benchmarks to ‘raise awareness’
about their causes. They also now depend on the metrics generated through these
programmes for outreach and fundraising efforts, which further explains NGO
interest and support for the audit regime. The Greenpeace campaign to reduce the
23 Peter Seligmann, ‘Conservation international’s CEO: Why Walmart gives me hope’, GreenBiz (9 May
2014), available at: {http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/05/09/retail-giant-walmart-asks-suppliers-
shrink-environmental-impact} accessed 8 April 2015.
24 Given corporate, NGO, and state involvement in the audit regime, within André Broome and Joel
Quirk’s typology of global benchmarking practices (this Special Issue), audits can be situated at the cusp
of type III (private market governance) and type IV (transnational advocacy). They can involve both
proﬁt-based and civil society organisations as monitoring agents, but seek to actuate transnational
market governance.
25 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, ‘EITI Validators’, available at: {http://eiti.org/validation/
validators} accessed 4 August 2014.
26 Fair Labor Organization, ‘FLA Accredited Monitoring Organizations’, available at: {http://www.fair-
labor.org/transparency/ﬂa-accredited-monitoring-organizations} accessed 4 August 2014.
27 Nestle, ‘Annual Report 2011’, available at:{http://static.globalreporting.org/report-pdfs/2012/
537fc4b7fef52936fc433f1f6a77a496.pdf} accessed 4 April 2014.
28 Fair Labor Organization, ‘FLA Accredited Monitoring Organizations’, available at: {http://www.fair-
labor.org/transparency/ﬂa-accredited-monitoring-organizations} accessed 4 August 2014.
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environmental impact of electronics for example, is centered on producing a widely
distributed Guide to Greener Electronics – a ranking of the ‘environmental leadership
efforts’ of brand electronics companies based on a score out of 10 on 12 criteria within
3 (shifting) categories of environmental impact (energy, products, operations).
Greenpeace conducts their benchmark evaluation using the public reports and
information that the brand companies produce. This has lead to criticism (particularly
from lower ranked companies such as Apple) that the campaign evaluates companies
for what they say rather than what they do. However, despite concerns about its
accuracy or effectiveness, their metrics-based report has given Greenpeace much
media attention and a positive impression with the general public (with the reporting
of speciﬁc company performance ﬁgures), that Greenpeace is ‘cracking the whip’ to
monitor and hold corporations to account.29 Meanwhile, the exercise of metrics
production has distracted attention by all sides away from the major underlying
environmental issue – planned obsolescence in electronics product design.
Given growing NGO buy-in, it is perhaps not surprising that at the global level,
too, benchmark audit-based initiatives are accelerating. The United Nation’s Global
Compact is premised upon the use of audit-based initiatives to ‘promote transparency
and disclosure as a means of driving performance’.30 Functioning as a ‘learning
network’, the Global Compact encourages ‘desirable behavior in corporations
through dialogue with different stakeholders and sharing of information’.31 The
associated Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has developed and disseminates
‘Sustainability Reporting Guidelines’, which companies can implement among their
suppliers, as well as assurance criteria for external audit veriﬁcation to determine
whether the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data have been reported
accurately.32 Financial institutions and states increasingly rely on these as proxy
indicators of corporate responsibility (particularly in offshore operations).33
Reﬂective of broader trends in the privatisation of global corporate governance,
states have helped to institutionalise voluntary, CSR-based forms of corporate
governance. Some of the environmental and social standards that retailers achieve
through audits – such as ISO 14000 – have actually been adopted by states and
international organisations as ofﬁcial standards, thus gaining ‘in strength and
legitimacy’. As Robert Falkner describes, ‘governments are expected to incorporate
them into their procurement and international bodies such as the WTO have
recognized the voluntary ISO standards as international standards under the WTO
system and as being consistent with the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement.’34
Certain states have also facilitated partnerships and coalitions, as the United States
did with the Climate Action Partnership (USCAP). This coalition brings
29 See ‘Greenpeace Electronics Guide Cracks the Whip’, BlueChannel 24, available at: {http://www.blue-
channel24.com/?p=7749} accessed 8 April 2015.
30 United Nations Global Compact, ‘Analyzing Progress’, available at: {http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
COP/analyzing_progress.html} accessed 5 November 2013.
31 Susanne Soederberg, ‘Taming corporations or buttressing market-led development? A critical assessment
of the global compact’, Globalizations, 4:4 (2007), p. 503. Signiﬁcantly, like other global transparency
programmes that encourage and facilitate corporate voluntary reporting, the Global Compact allows
companies to set their own measures and report on progress towards these, rather than setting universal
benchmarks. Performance comparisons between companies are therefore difﬁcult.
32 Global Reporting Initiative, ‘The External Assurance of Sustainability Reporting’ (2013), available at:
{https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRI-Assurance.pdf} accessed 8 April 2015.
33 David Vogel, ‘The private regulation of global corporate conduct: Achievements and limitations’,
Business & Society, 49:1 (2010), pp. 68–87.
34 Falkner, ‘Private environmental governance’, p. 77.
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environmental organisations such as the Environmental Defense Fund, The Nature
Conservancy, and the World Resources Institute, together with Shell, NRG Energy,
as well PepsiCo, DuPont, The Dow Chemical Company, Rio Tinto, and General
Electric.35 As networks and institutions become shaped around audit-based
accountability systems, the prevalence of ‘ethical audits’ can be expected to increase
not diminish.
The power of audits in transnational corporate governance
The growing adoption of audits and associated benchmarking regimes as a corporate
governance mechanism is primarily an effort to mediate the labour and environmental
risks inherent in the retail-driven, low-cost, high volume, model of distant global
production that currently reigns in the global economy. As big brand ﬁrms and
retailers have grown rapidly in recent years – with Walmart’s total global sales
nearing $500 billion – they have pioneered a business model in which they coordinate
the production of goods through loose and arm’s length relationships with tens of
thousands of independent suppliers, but don’t actually produce goods themselves. The
acceleration of ever-more complex forms of subcontracting has meant that global
retail supply chains are increasingly long and complex with many ‘tiers’ of outsourced
production.36 Walmart, for instance, now sources from over 100,000 global suppliers,
who source from a diffuse and elaborate global production network.37 Simply put, the
retail model of global production has developed to maximise lead ﬁrms’ ﬂexibility and
continuously reduce costs and liability associated with production. As retailers have
grown in size and market power, they have exerted downward pressure on contract
length, turnaround times, and margins in many industries, ‘squeezing’ their suppliers.
This business model and power dynamics introduce endemic labour and
environmental risk into global supply chains, as supplier ﬁrms struggle to fulﬁll
orders on time and at a low-cost, creating incentives to cut corners.38
Retailers and big brands initially introduced auditing as an internal tool to
monitor and manage risks within their global operations, examining and measuring
organisational non-ﬁnancial performance, as well as key suppliers. But as NGO and
journalist exposés of rampant child and ‘sweatshop’ labour and environmental
malpractice in overseas production sites yielded calls for greater corporate
transparency and accountability beginning in the late 1990s and throughout the
early 2000s, brands began to adopt audits not as an heuristic device, but as tools to
mediate and resolve the tensions and contradictions inherent in outsourced, low-cost,
quick turnaround production. In the wake of persistent non-compliance issues, brands
began hiring independent (but often for-proﬁt) audit ﬁrms to monitor supplier
factories, such as Apple most recently did with its Tier 1 supplier Foxconn in the wake
of a wave of worker suicides and reports of forced overtime.39 Given the need to
35 United States Climate Action Partnership, available at: {http://www.us-cap.org/} accessed 4
August 2014.
36 William Milberg and Deborah Winkler, Outsourcing Economics: Global Value Chains in Capitalist
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); see also: Layna Mosley, Labor Rights and
Multinational Production (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
37 Walmart, ‘Walmart Announces Sustainable Product Index’, available at: {http://news.walmart.com/
news-archive/2009/07/16/walmart-announces-sustainable-product-index} accessed 4 August 2014.
38 See, for example, Milberg and Winkler, Outsourcing Economics.
39 See, for example, Stanley James and Adam Satariano, ‘Apple Opens Suppliers’ Doors to Labor Group
After Foxconn Worker Suicides’ (13 January 2014), available at: {http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-01-13/apple-opens-suppliers-doors-to-labor-group-after-foxconn-worker-suicides.html} accessed 1
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govern global corporate practices in a world lacking global regulation, and in the face
of declining state-based corporate monitoring, the auditing regime has stepped into
the lurch, with experts and the organisations driving adoption (as described above)
claiming that it promotes supply chain transparency, accountability, and
improvements.
The difﬁculty, however, is that audits are an inadequate mechanism for ensuring
global corporate accountability. While, as we document, this dynamic relates to
weaknesses in the audit regime’s design and functioning, it is important to note here
that audit ineffectiveness is also rooted in and reﬂects the tensions and limits of
benchmarking as a form of supply chain governance ‘at a distance’. As critical
scholars of the audit regime such as Dara O’Rourke and Richard Locke argue40 and
as our interviewees conﬁrm, auditing produces standardised metrics, measurements,
and rankings that create the appearance of independent supply chain monitoring; yet,
the information produced through and derived from audits is partial, highly political,
and fundamentally shaped by the retail audit client.
As one auditor described, most audit ﬁrms have no investigative powers, so have
limited capacity to verify that the information presented to them is accurate: ‘you
have no powers of search so you cannot open a locked drawer, you cannot check to
see how much tax is being paid or has actually been paid, you can look at a record
that says something but you wouldn’t be able to go and ﬁnd out whether it’s actually
true’.41 As another auditor argued, the audit regime is not actually designed to drive
improvements in supplier practices: ‘an audit is a diagnostic tool; it doesn’t ﬁx things.
It doesn’t matter how many times we audit a factory, it doesn’t mean they’re going to
improve.’42 The former Director of CSR for a major US outdoor gear retail company
emphasised the limits very clearly: ‘Within the social compliance world, it is now
standard operating understanding that audits don’t work to achieve change within
organizations. That’s widely discussed from folks at the Gap to Patagonia to you
name it. In the NGO community, many social activists would also say that the
results indicate that audits don’t work in terms of actually effecting real change on
the ground.’43
Indeed, as a number of recent studies have documented and as companies have
acknowledged, the capacity of the audit regime to detect, report, and correct non-
compliance is limited.44 Yet, in spite of mounting evidence of its ineffectiveness, the
audit regime is extending and gaining legitimacy as a global regulatory mechanism, as
September 2014; Susan Adams, ‘Apple’s New Foxconn Embarrassment’, Forbes (9 December 2012),
available at: {http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2012/09/12/apples-new-foxconn-embarrassment/}
accessed 1 September 2014.
40 Dara O’Rourke, ‘Monitoring the monitors: a critique of corporate third-party Labour monitoring’, in
Rhys Jenkins, Ruth Pearson, and Gill Seyfang (eds), Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights: Codes
of Conduct in the Global Economy (London: Earthscan, 2002), pp. 196–207; Locke, The Promise and
Limits of Private Power.
41 Personal communication with auditor, London, 6 March 2013.
42 Personal communication with audit ﬁrm Director of Sustainability, London, 13 March 2013.
43 Personal communication with a former Director of CSR, US retail company, 12 July 2013, Seattle.
44 Richard Locke at MIT’s 4-year analysis of Nike’s audit programme (2001–5) found that workplace
conditions in almost 80 per cent of suppliers remained the same or worsened over time. Nike states in
their 2012 Sustainable Business Report, ‘… we have learned that monitoring does not bring about
sustainable change. Often, it only reinforces a pattern of hiding problems.’ Similarly, HP concludes in
their 2013 CSR report, ‘although audits can be an excellent measurement tool, they only provide a
snapshot of performance and do not lead to lasting performance improvements on their own’. See also
Jean Allain, Andrew Crane, Genevieve LeBaron, and Laya Behbahani, Forced Labour’s Business Models
and Supply Chains (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2013).
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NGOs and governments endorse and delegate authority to audit mechanisms as part
of the broader consensus around the effectiveness and efﬁciency of market-based
approaches to global governance. Through increasingly sophisticated metrics, and the
inclusion of key expert communities, the audit regime is creating the appearance of
global supply chain governance and ‘continuous improvement’ when it in fact serves
to legitimate business as usual. As one of our informants explained, ‘there is a whole
industry of ethical auditors out there now who will ﬁnd nothing if you pay them to go
and ﬁnd nothing’.45 In another informant’s words, many auditors ‘are not trying to
ﬁnd things out, they are trying to prove that something is not there’.46
As auditors are bound by rigid conﬁdentiality clauses, their retail clients exercise
full discretion over what audit information is ultimately reported. Information is
typically shared with the supplier ﬁrm but is rarely made available to governments or
the public. This means that issues like forced labour, human trafﬁcking, or pollution
are not reported to regulators or consumers, and are rarely resolved. Auditors
typically offer expert advice to aid the audited factory in preparing an action plan to
address the non-compliance ﬁndings.47 However, the auditor has no inﬂuence over the
company’s eventual business decisions and there is no external accountability for the
action plans. The audit information that is publicly circulated is typically in the form
of general metrics and aggregated analysis that effectively provide neutralised
accounts of corporate practices to governments, investors, and consumers. These
reports produced by retailers, experts, and multi-stakeholder coalitions consequently
serve to codify and legitimate rather than expose and challenge endemic, poor
environmental and social problems that lie at the heart of the retail business model.
The independent power of the audit regime
Before turning to explore the inadequacies of the audit regime in greater institutional
detail, it is important to note that although insiders recognise the audit system is
grossly inadequate, the knowledge generated through the audit system plays a
productive role in shaping public and policymakers’ perceptions of corporate
practices. Corporations are increasingly aware of this, and are investing in devising,
producing, and publicising new metrics not only as legitimation techniques to prevent
more stringent restrictions on their activities, but also as a tool for sales and
competitive advantage.
Revealingly, in 2014, the global industry organisation Sustainable Brands – which
features Nestlé, Mars, Coca Cola, Target, Unilever, and Disney as members –
convened a conference on ‘New Metrics’. The conference promised to convene
business leaders to ‘deﬁne the business metrics of the future … [to] ﬁnd new
approaches to value risk and impact that lead to successful business results’. The
‘10 Reasons to Attend New Metrics 14’ advertised to potential attendees included the
following: ‘There are growing opportunities to quantify brand value added through
innovation for sustainability; Consumers are starting to bypass or boycott clearly
unsustainable products and services; Leading methodologies for quantifying both
environmental and social impacts are getting sophisticated; Your sustainability
performance will be ranked by external stakeholders anyways, so it’s a good idea
45 Personal communication with labour NGO representative, London, March 2013.
46 Personal communication with auditor, London, 6 March 2013.
47 Salo Coslovsky and Richard Locke, ‘Parallel paths to enforcement: Private compliance, public regula-
tion, and labour standards in the Brazilian Sugar Sector’, Politics & Society, 41:4 (2013), pp. 497–526.
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to lead; You could be inﬂuencing policy makers and politicians more effectively,
armed with new impact assessments.’48 In short, this discourse reﬂects a growing
recognition by corporations of the utility of supply chain benchmarks – not to change
their business practice so much as to transform understanding of their practices, and
in so doing, generate sales, inﬂuence regulatory outcomes, and capture greater
business gains.
Corporate interest in generating new metrics is grounded in a business desire to
control performance information so as to shape reputational perceptions and
expectations of company value. Metrics enable industry to strategically present
normative, partial, and fragmented information about their practices in a way that is
viewed as scientiﬁc and objective and hence, trustworthy and reliable. As legal scholar
Galit Sarfaty explains, ‘the use of quantitative indicators can be fraught with
problems, which are often overlooked due to the authoritative quality of numbers’.49
These insights point to the need to understand the audit regime as a productive
form of power, which is ‘changing understandings, meanings, norms, customs, and
social identities that make possible, limit, and are drawn on for action’.50 The audit
regime is not only bolstering corporate power and inﬂuence, but the generated
knowledge and associated metrics are also increasing corporations’ ‘public and
private authority in the international realm by enabling indirect forms of power that
operate through abstract knowledge practice’.51 Ultimately, although the audit-based
data reported by retailers obscures more than it reveals about environmental and
social problems within supply chains, the sheer volume of information and metrics
produced through audits, and the scientiﬁc authority constructed through the
involvement of ‘independent’ experts, ‘represent and reify particular normative
standards by rendering ideas about appropriate modes of conduct into observable
data’.52 In the context of neoliberal globalisation, these discursive trends are
paralleled by and serve to deepen the power and proﬁtability of ﬁrms.
Compliance audits and the concealment of ethical problems
Despite their ineffectiveness, compliance audits continue to gain legitimacy as a
mechanism of global corporate accountability due to their perceived neutrality as
anchored in supposedly objective metrics. However, as this section shows, audits are
far from impartial. Rather, the problems with audit effectiveness in this respect
manifest around the politicisation of audit design and scope by powerful business
interests. This includes highly strategic corporate control over both how audits are
conducted as well as what they are evaluating. Given the evidence presented in this
section, we argue that audits are serving to reinforce and legitimise rather than
challenge the inequities in power relations within global value chains that are at the
root of continually occurring environmental and labour problems. While compliance
auditing has increased over the past decade, it has done little to transform corporate
practices or improve overall environmental conditions. Focused on limited,
incremental adjustments to operations, the compliance audit regime is ultimately
48 Personal communication with Sustainable Brands, 2 September 2014.
49 Galit Sarfaty, ‘Regulating through numbers: a case of corporate sustainability reporting’, Virginia
Journal of International Law, 53 (2011), pp. 580–1.
50 See Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in international politics’, p. 56.
51 André Broome and Joel Quirk, ‘Governing the world at a distance’.
52 Ibid.
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allowing companies to stave off efforts to impose more stringent public regulation and
truly accountable restrictions on production.
Procedural politics of audit design
Every multinational brand retail company has their own, unique ‘ethical compliance’
audit programme to manage their business risks and increase their control over their
suppliers. Although many retailers share the same suppliers and source products from
the same offshore factories, their audit processes vary. The main procedural
differences include: the timing of the audit, the auditors selected, and the
communication of results. Decisions around each of these factors are highly
strategic as they play a signiﬁcant role in determining the audit ﬁndings which
companies then shape and communicate for reputation management and legitimacy
(social license) to operate and grow.
Strategic scheduling
Decisions on audit scheduling have signiﬁcant bearing on audit results. The time of
year, frequency of audits, and whether it is an announced or surprise audit will affect
what is revealed or not. An audit conducted during peak production cycle before
Christmas, for example is much more likely to uncover ‘non-conformance incidents’
such as illegal workers and unacceptable working conditions than during slower off-
peak periods. A more frequent audit than one every few years is also much more likely
to uncover problems and yield greater understanding to trace and address the source of
the factory conditions. And ﬁnally, whether the audit is a ‘surprise’ versus scheduled in
advance will inﬂuence the extent to which the factory can potentially obfuscate
problems (for example, falsify records, shift labour, move production to a shadow
company, etc.). Scheduling elements are not standardised across company audits.
Rather, companies ‘play’ with varying these audit design elements depending on their
interests to expose a more or less accurate picture of supplier factory conditions.
Controlled audit delegation
The independence and expertise of the audit team also bears on the results of the audit
and companies select their auditors for strategic reasons depending on what they want or
do not want to ﬁnd out about their suppliers. This includes varying whether the auditors
are internal to the company or constitute an independent third party; and whether they
are local experts or professionally designated auditors brought in from outside.
Because of the proliferation of voluntary compliance standards and certiﬁcation
schemes over the past two decades, there are now many accredited audit ﬁrms to
select from. They conduct audits to company codes as well as a wide range of social
and environmental certiﬁcation standards. In agriculture alone, there are ‘more than
300 accredited certiﬁcation bodies around the world providing inspection and
certiﬁcation services to organic farmers and producers’ (50 per cent do other audits as
well).53 The large professional accounting ﬁrms such as PwC, Deloitte, KPMG, and
Ernst & Young also all have accredited groups that conduct sustainability audits.
53 International Organic Accreditation Service (IOAS), ‘Certiﬁcation Body Database’, available at: {http://
www.ioas.org/certiﬁcation_body/} accessed 4 August 2014.
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For assessing compliance, companies choose whether to contract out to an
independent auditor or whether to utilise internal audit teams. An internal team enables
greater control over the audit process but may also compromise perceived objectivity,
potentially threatening some of the reputational capital companies aim to gain from
having an audit programme. A third party auditor is generally deemed more neutral
and hence, legitimate. Yet, even with third party auditors, the audit process in not
impartial. Walmart, for example, applies its own criteria for selecting a list of whom it
deems ‘acceptable’ auditors from which their suppliers may only choose.
Politics also come into play in the development of audit protocols (that deﬁne the
metrics and benchmarks for compliance). The interpretation of protocols is often
heavily shaped by the auditor/client relationship. Whether a professional global
accounting ﬁrm or local audit business, the auditor is never free of the potential for
conﬂict of interest and bias from wanting to modify audit results in order to obtain
payment and retain the business contract.54 This may mean reporting ‘corrective
action’ audit results in a more positive or negative light (that is, minor versus major
non-conformance) depending on the interests of the client (for example, the retail
buyer, the supplier, or the certiﬁcation body). Certiﬁcation auditors may, in particular
be inﬂuenced towards leniency by the need to gain or maintain corporate participants
in their programmes (to gain scale and legitimacy of their standards) rather than
outright ‘disqualify’ companies that fail to meet the standards. The inconsistency of
Forest Stewardship Council audits and continuing challenges to many of the
certiﬁcations awarded provide a good example of the varying auditor expertise and
the politics of auditor conﬂict of interest.55
Constructed transparency
Although lauded as a means to improve corporate transparency and accountability,
as mentioned, audit results reports are in fact private information – held conﬁdentially
between the client and auditor. Findings that are communicated publically are
strategically aggregated so as to conceal the location, type and size of the factory,
as well as the scope and criteria of the audits and precise description of the
non-compliance problem encountered. Even the names of suppliers are typically
withheld. Nike consolidates factory audit data into a single ‘sourcing and
manufacturing sustainability index’ to measure the extent to which a contracted
factory is ‘lean, green, equitable and empowered’.56 Many companies provide audit
results as percentages of high, medium, or low compliance by geographic region with
comparisons in percentage totals between years. The factories audited, however, differ
from year to year so the numbers reported do not actually convey any sort of useful or
consistent information as to whether conditions at certain factories are improving or
worsening and if so, in what way. The reported audit metrics are carefully shaped to
give the illusion of progress.
54 See the recent study of 44,383 social audits in 47 countries by Michael Toffel and colleagues at the
Harvard Business School that ﬁnds ‘evidence suggesting that violations recorded in audits might indeed
be inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest and by auditor competence’. (Michael Toffel, Jodi Short,
and Melissa Ouellet, ‘Codes in context: How states, markets, and civil society shape adherence to global
labor standards’, Regulation & Governance, doi:10.1111/rego.12076 (2015), p. 16.
55 Jane Lister, Corporate Social Responsibility and the State (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).
56 Nike, ‘Sustainable Business Report’ (2013), available at: {http://www.nikeresponsibility.com/report/ﬁles/
report/NIKE_SUSTAINABLE_BUSINESS_REPORT__FY10-11_FINAL.pdf} accessed 3 April 2014.
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Material limits in audit scope
It is not just the discretion companies wield with how compliance audits are conducted
that conceal problems but also perhaps even more signiﬁcantly, the accepted power
companies have to shape what the auditors evaluate.
Facilities focus
The scope of compliance audits is not standardised. Some consist of a minimal offsite
desk review of documentation and records; others a telephone interview with
management; and others (most frequently), an onsite factory investigation. The
greater the number of days onsite and the larger the number of interviews with
management, employees and outside stakeholders (for example, community members,
subcontractors, local government), the greater the costs and the more comprehensive
the audit ﬁndings. Companies closely control the scope of the audit based on their
resources and the extent that they want to know the problems going on.
Increasingly, retailers are designing their audit focus around a risk scale. HP’s,
for example, ranks suppliers and factories by country risk, length of business
relationship, and previous audit ﬁndings. While this may give the impression that
the company is addressing its biggest problems, it hides that poor supplier practices
may still persist – having simply been shifted around as suppliers focus their
attention only to those areas under audit scrutiny while ignoring other areas in
a constantly moving game of ‘cat-and-mouse’ obfuscation driven by the audit
programme.
Accountability beyond the factory gates
Audits focus on the immediate factory environment, operations and employees while
omitting large parts of the supply chain beyond the factory gates where the most
egregious conditions often occur. Although many retailers and brand ﬁrms portray
audits as ‘comprehensive’, they in fact only cover a small percentage of top-tier
suppliers. Apple, for example, claimed in 2012 to be ‘going deeper into the supply
chain than any other company we know of’, and ‘reporting at a level of detail
unparalleled in our industry’. And yet, Apple was only auditing a portion of its top
Tier 1 suppliers and ignoring subcontract facilities. With one of the industry’s longest
established supply chain social and environmental responsibility (SER) audit
programmes (implemented in 2001), HP openly admits in its 2013 CSR report, the
gaps of its programme in evaluating 2nd and 3rd tier suppliers as well as ‘non-
production’ call centres and labour agencies.
Because the path of social audits is typically built around a product supply chain
rather than a ‘labour supply chain’, audits tend to exclude some of the most
vulnerable workers within the supply chains.57 While audits tend to look only at
workers on the books, the most exploited workers tend to be employed through
complex labour-subcontracting arrangements, and are several steps removed from
producers’ core workforces. As one of our informants described, ‘there could always
57 A labour supply chain ‘consists of the sequence of employment relationships that a worker goes through
in order to be deployed in a productive capacity’. See Allain, Crane, LeBaron, and Behbahani, Forced
Labour’s Business Models.
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be another group of people’58 who are not on the books. Our interviewees also
explained that factory owners commonly rid their production facilities of agency or
exploited workers during audits. In addition, because audits are ‘snapshots’ of labour
practices on any given day, they do not encompass illegal practices that might have
taken place prior to employment but nevertheless shape employment conditions. This
is well illustrated by the major issue of debt bondage. As Apple describes in its 2012
annual report, labour recruiters within their supply chains often charge enormous
recruitment fees, which workers then become indebted to pay back, and those debts
are used to maximise exploitation and immobility during work. To its credit, Apple
claims to have refunded $17 million in recruitment fees since 2008 alone,59 but most
companies have been far less responsive – their audit programmes overlook the issue.
These gaps in the audit mechanism are signiﬁcant not just because of the large
portions of the supply chain that are not measured (and thus, hardly ‘managed’), but
also because they illustrate how the pathway of most audits is structured in such a way
as to conceal, rather than bring to light, some of the worst abuses in the supply chain.
Uneven measurement of labour and environmental problems
Audits conceal problems by the narrow range of company operations investigated but
also by their uneven treatment of labour and environmental issue areas. Whereas
‘people’ (for example, employee wellbeing, worker conditions) are hard to quantify,
environmental concerns translate more easily into business efﬁciency and ﬁnancial
gains. The case for competitive advantage in ‘corporate greening’ is well documented.
Therefore, management systems and metrics to evaluate and benchmark
environmental performance are more comprehensive than for labour60 with the
signiﬁcant consequence of greater investment in environmental programmes at the
growing cost of social welfare.
Environmental concerns are more closely considered a strategic investment issue
with direct bearing on operational efﬁciency, access to capital (risk management) and
the bottomline.61 Using less materials and energy and cutting back on waste saves
money and drives sales. General Electric, for example, set a 5-year $25 billion revenue
target when it launched its Ecomagination clean technology environmental
programme in 2005 and has since (according to the company’s 2011 progress
report) realised over ‘140 [environmental] products and solutions and $105 billion in
revenue’. Social concerns on the other hand are addressed by a narrow set of
traditional business metrics including total employee wage, beneﬁts, and overtime
expenditures that are too generalised to reveal the problems of actual working
conditions and employee treatment essential to ensuring a healthy, safe, and stable
workplace. Whereas companies increasingly consider environmental programmes an
investment in greater efﬁciency, social programmes are treated as a business cost.
Rather than weighing and measuring the anticipated rate of return of social
programmes, companies generally accept that any returns are ‘intangible’ and adopt
58 Personal communication with auditor, London, March 2013.
59 See Apple, ‘Supplier Responsibility: Empowering Workers’, available at: {http://www.apple.com/sup-
plier-responsibility/labor-and-human-rights/} accessed 1 September 2014.
60 Ketty Kortelainen, ‘Global supply chains and social requirements: Case studies of labour conditions
auditing in the People’s Republic of China’, Business Strategy and the Environment, 17 (2008), p. 433.
61 Michael Porter and Claas Van der Linde, ‘Green and competitive: Ending the stalemate’, Harvard
Business Review, 75:5 (1995), pp. 120–51.
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them on the basis that it is simply a ‘necessary cost of doing (staying in) business’. The
concealment of labour issues is further reinforced by how the audit pathway is built
around the product supply chain and not the labour supply chain.62 As a
consequence, audits miss many of the growing labour problems such as factory
owners increasingly ‘handing off’ their labour responsibilities by bringing in more
and more temporary contracted workers for which they are not liable.
Company efforts reveal the uneven treatment of social and environmental
concerns. Walmart, for instance, has pursued ambitious corporate environmental
programs in recent years but not social compliance standards or social certiﬁcations.
Consequently, they are winning awards for developing leading ‘business solutions’
with respect to climate change and renewable energy while at the same time
representing a lightning rod for unfair labour practices (for example, forcing overtime,
paying below minimum wage, and refusing employee requests to unionise). Nestlé
also highlights the shortcomings of an audit-based compliance programme based on a
bifurcated environmental and social approach. After proudly announcing the
Fairtrade certiﬁcation of its Kit Kat bar, Greenpeace launched a campaign against
the product, calling it out for destroying Indonesian Orangutan habitat and
rebranding it, ‘ethical chocolate from environmentally destructive palm oil’. The
highly successful campaign pointed the ﬁnger directly at Nestlé for trying to hide a
damaging product behind its Fairtrade certiﬁcation. In another, among a growing
number of examples, the Lipton brand of tea have recently achieved the ‘green’
Rainforest Alliance Certiﬁcation, in spite of the fact that there is widely reported child
labour in its tea supply chain.63 The bifurcation of environmental and social standards
and audit programmes allows companies to work towards improvements in one
sphere – typically the environmental sphere – while allowing problems to persist or
even worsen in the other sphere.
Our site visit to Chun Wo Ho in 2012, also revealed ﬁrsthand how environmental
concerns are treated differently than labour considerations due to the more tangible
business value gains of environmental versus social programmes as embedded in
certiﬁcation and company audit programmes.64 Chun Wo Ho is a medium-sized,
family-owned and operated Chinese manufacturing company that makes accessories
like trim and zippers for outdoor apparel and gear. Established in 1971, the company
head ofﬁce is in Hong Kong and its factories are located in and around nearby
Shenzhen – China’s fastest growing city and the home of Foxconn, one of Apple’s
biggest suppliers. Products produced include: lace and trimming, cordage, twine and
string (drawcords), braid and webbing (including elasticised), and imitation leather
and plastic belts. The company supplies its products to a growing customer base
including major brands such as Nike, North Face, Converse, Mammot, and Disney
who then sell to consumers worldwide through multinational retail stores such as
Costco, Target, and Walmart. Chun Wo Ho’s corporate tag line is four words:
‘Reliable. Responsible. Integrity. Value.’ The company has recognised the role of
responsible, sustainable business practice for ensuring access to top tier North
American and European markets and customers. While recognising the importance of
62 Allain, Crane, LeBaron and Behbahani, Forced Labour’s Business Models.
63 See, for example, Gethin Chamberlain, ‘How Poverty Wages for Tea Pickers Fuel Indian’s Trade in
Child Slavery’, The Guardian, available at: {http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/20/poverty-tea-
pickers-india-child-slavery} accessed 20 July 2013.
64 Jane Lister and Genevieve LeBaron, Shopping for Sustainability at the Canton Fair: The Political
Economy of Transnational Retail Governance in China, Liu Institute for Global Issues Working Paper
Series 12-001 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2012).
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both environmental and social sustainability, the company has put greater emphasis
on and investment in its environmental programmes. As the company director,
Jason Mak explained, ‘there are cost incentives for environmental reforms but no
real cost incentive to increase health and safety or labor conditions more broadly’.65
In June 2009, Chun Wo Ho signed onto the Swiss-based Bluesign environmental
programme (the apparel industry’s sustainable production standard) to ‘provide
performance products with a reduced environmental footprint’.66 To meet the
Bluesign commitment the company spent $1 million on environmental improvements,
speciﬁcally on new production equipment and process upgrades. Workplace safety
improvements were also identiﬁed for future expenditure but at $100,000. These
comprised one-tenth the amount of the environmental systems. Efﬁciency gains and
investment payback were not expected from social investments.
Chun Wo Ho made the decision to invest $1 million in environmental
improvements after calculating that, through cost-savings due to eco-efﬁciencies
and increased sales from achieving Bluesign certiﬁcation, they would be able to
recover the investment and generate new proﬁt within three years. But Bluesign would
also yield an additional and longer-term source of cost savings: the replacement of
human labour with machinery. In the short term, Mak explained, the cost of
environmental improvements would be met by shedding and raising labour
productivity.
Narrow and bifurcated audit metrics do not capture this interacting dynamic of
environmental and social conditions – that is, how the supplier was looking to recover
the cost of its brand buyer’s and consumers’ rising environmental expectations
through changes to its workforce. This has global regulatory signiﬁcance as this
emerging business strategy is not unique to Chun Wo Ho. Because corporate
environmental sustainability yields more measurable direct business value than social
improvements, there is a growing tendency to privilege the former over the latter.
Canton Fair vendors we interviewed consistently noted that environmental standards
and certiﬁcations were more feasible and desirable than social ones. This was
particularly the case given their retail customers’ tight turnaround times, ﬂuctuating
order sizes, and requirements for low-priced production, which they informed us they
were meeting largely through increased overtime and agency workers (which tend
to be lower paid and face severe restrictions on their ability to assert rights).
As companies have linked their growth strategies to clean water and state-of-the-art
eco-friendly technology, workers rights, conditions, and job security have at best,
lagged, and at worst, been undermined.
A major 2012 study of CSR in the apparel industry clariﬁes this point.67 Assessing
management systems in four categories – Policies, Traceability & Transparency,
Monitoring & Training, and Workers Rights – the study evaluated 300 apparel
brands on their efforts to address child and forced labour in their supply chains. Firms
currently championed for their corporate environmental initiatives – such as Walmart
and Adidas – ranked among the lowest in social performance and efforts to address
forced labour. In spite of its improvements around renewable energy, waste, and
carbon, Walmart’s traceability, transparency, and workers’ rights records ranked
65 Personal communication at Chun Wo Ho factory, Shenzen, China, 27 April 2012.
66 Bluesign, ‘About’, available at: {http://www.bluesign.com} accessed 4 August 2014.
67 Haley Wrinkle, Elin Eriksson, and Adrienne Lee, Apparel Industry Trends: From Farm to Factory,
available at: {http://www.free2work.org/trends/apparel/Apparel-Industry-Trends-2012.pdf} accessed 4
August 2014.
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among the lowest in protecting against child and forced labour. In an illuminating
paradox, Walmart now requires the seafood it sells to come from ﬁsheries that are
Marine Stewardship Council certiﬁed (or equivalent, or part of a credible ﬁshery
improvement project). Yet, the company is consistently accused of negligence around
forced and bonded labour found within seafood harvest and packaging within its
supply chain, such as in The Guardian investigation discussed earlier.68 In a similar
vein, Adidas is currently celebrated as an environmental sustainability leader, but its
Monitoring & Training record is so insufﬁcient that on 14 March 2013, Penn State
University suspended its apparel contract with the company.69
In summary, compliance audits purport to provide objective evidence and
comprehensive ‘data’ through standardised metrics on the social and environmental
conditions at supplier factories. However, as this section reveals audit information is
politicised, partial, and largely held conﬁdentially. Retailers aggregate supplier
improvement metrics resulting in praise in some areas while egregious violations go
unattended in others. Audits give the impression of transparency and accountability
when, in fact, in many cases, they obscure and deﬂect attention from the most
damaging corporate practices. As a global regulatory mechanism they are ultimately
serving to legitimise the status quo – reinforcing rather than transforming the
underlying problem of unbalanced capital accumulation through buyer-supplier
supply chain power inequities.
The ineffectiveness of the audit regime as a mechanism of global corporate
regulation is underpinned, as this section revealed, by how audits are designed and
practiced. The audit regime, however, cannot be ‘ﬁxed’ through institutional redesign.
While companies can address certain weaknesses in their audit programmes to
increase supplier compliance such as by adjusting penalties70 and improving auditor
skills,71 these efforts constitute only a ‘tweaking’ or ‘tinkering’ at the edges. They do
not get at the much deeper systemic problems embedded in the power dynamics and
as André Broome and Joel Quirk stress (in this Special Issue): the political agenda
underlying the regime.
Conclusion
As part of a broader trend towards supply chain benchmarking, the audit regime
ultimately disguises a normative, market-based governance agenda in seemingly
objective systems of veriﬁcation and associated metrics. Among insiders, the audit
regime is widely accepted to be ineffective in addressing the environmental and social
problems endemic to the transnational retail business model. Yet, in the face of deﬁcient
68 International Labour Rights Forum and Warehouse Workers United, ‘The Walmart Effect: Child and
Worker Rights Violations at Narong Seafood’s Thailand Model Shrimp Processing Factory’, available
at: {http://www.laborrights.org/publications/walmart-effect-child-and-worker-rights-violations-narong-
seafood} accessed 5 November 2013. See also Walmart, ‘Making Seafood More Sustainable’, available
at: {http://www.walmartgreenroom.com/2013/03/making-seafood-more-sustainable-one-ﬁshery-at-a-
time/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+walmartgreenroom%
2FlJlQ+%28The+Green+Room%29} accessed 3 August 2013.
69 Simon Van Zuylen-Wood, ‘Penn State Cuts Off Adidas Over Sweatshop Complaint’, available at:
{http://www.phillymag.com/news/2013/03/14/penn-state-2/} accessed 4 August 2014.
70 Erica Plambeck and Terry Taylor, ‘Motivating Compliance with Labour and Environmental Standards’,
Working Paper No. 3176, Stanford Graduate School of Business (March 2015), available at: {http://
www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/supplier-evasion-buyers-audit-implications-moti-
vating-compliance} accessed 10 April 2015.
71 Kortelainen, ‘Global supply chains and social requirements’, p. 441.
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legally binding systems of supply chain governance, states are adopting the audit regime
to create the illusion of transnational corporate monitoring where there is in fact very
little. As NGOs have developed an interest in the reputational and ﬁnancial beneﬁts of
supply chain benchmarking, they too have helped to codify and neutralise corporations’
poor environmental and social records, and have deepened the credibility and legitimacy
of auditing. Brieﬂy put, while the drivers motivating industry, NGOs, and states to
institutionalise the audit regime vary, their increasing participation reﬂects an alignment
of these actors’ interests and ideologies in market-based global governance. The growing
adoption of audits as a tool of global corporate governance is bolstering corporate
power, interests, and inﬂuence over consumers and policymakers, and ultimately, is
deepening corporations’ power to make their own rules and norms, and to evaluate and
report on their own performance and adherence to those rules.
The consequences for global corporate governance are signiﬁcant. As noted in
Section I, states and ﬁnancial institutions increasingly rely on audit-based information
to estimate and assess corporate responsibility. Furthermore, states are increasingly
adopting audit-based approaches to ﬁxing serious supply chain problems. But given
the serious shortcomings of the audit system, the prospects for addressing the key
ﬂaws of the global production system – including forced labour and slavery, or
environmental destruction, pollution, and chemical spills and dumping – seem
increasingly limited. Rather than improving practices, recent initiatives ultimately
reinforce the privileging of private interests over protecting the public good in the
global regulatory sphere. Indeed, that growing adoption of audits is accelerating at
the same time as audit ineffectiveness is becoming more widely recognised – including
by brand and retail businesses themselves – suggests that supply chain benchmarking
is much more about reifying and legitimating standard business aims and practice
than driving actual environmental or social improvements.
While we have endeavoured to show that the weakness of audits as a tool for
driving environmental and social improvements is rooted in audit design, power
relations, and implementation, it is also notable that certain weaknesses that have
been previously identiﬁed in ‘governing the world at a distance’ through
benchmarking do seem to limit the capacity of the audit regime as a form of global
corporate governance.72 Audits bring ‘a semblance of certainty, relative standing, and
measurable temporal change to an otherwise unmanageably complex world’,73 but
that certainty serves to stabilise, legitimise and reinforce endemic problems within
supply chains. Enclosing authority within expert knowledge, the symbolic power
generated through audits has helped companies to stave off more stringent forms of
regulation or restrictions on their activities. As with other benchmarks, therefore, the
audit regime must be seen as ‘an exercise in symbolic power that can alter the
cognitive understandings that international actors use to make sense of the world and
to purposively act upon it’.74
72 See Broome and Quirk, ‘Governing the world at a distance’; Liam Clegg, ‘Benchmarking and blame
games: Exploring the contestation of the Millennium Development Goals’; Harrison and Sekalala,
‘Addressing the compliance gap?’; Alexandra Homolar, ‘Human security benchmarks: Governing human
wellbeing at a distance’; Caroline Kuzemko, ‘Climate change benchmarking: Constructing a sensible
future?’; Porter, ‘Global benchmarking networks’; Leonard Seabrooke and Ducan Wigan, ‘How activists
use benchmarks: Reformist and revolutionary benchmarks for global economic justice’; Sending and Lie,
‘The limits of global authority’: all of the articles listed here in Review of International Studies, 41:5
(2015), pp. 813–1010.
73 Broome and Quirk, ‘Governing the world at a distance’.
74 Ibid.
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